The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale. The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad. The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it. The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts. The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title. The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith. The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess. The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties. The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents. Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement. The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct. In this case, all these requirements were present. Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1YsPJKfdoD/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity. In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy. Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General. During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato. In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration. The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent. In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://web.facebook.com/share/p/19T4DMKA1z/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) En Banc, during its session today, August 5, 2026, dismissed the consolidated petitions questioning the proceedings before the House of Representatives and its Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaints against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte. The SC ruled that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. No. E-05546 (Atty. Israelito P. Torreon, et al. v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, represented by Hon. Gerville Luistro, and House of Representatives, represented by House Speaker Faustino Dy III) and G.R. No. E-05667 (Sara Z. Duterte, in her capacity as the Vice President of the Philippines v. House of Representatives et al.) had become moot, or no longer required resolution, because the House had already approved and transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. In its Resolution, the SC dismissed the separate petitions filed by Atty. Israelito P. Torreon, et al., and by Vice President Duterte. The petitioners argued that the House Committee on Justice exceeded its constitutional authority by gathering evidence and compelling witnesses to appear during its initial review of the impeachment complaints. They also questioned the Committee’s findings that the complaints were sufficient in form, substance, and grounds. The SC explained that the House’s transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment marked the end of the House’s role in the impeachment process and the initiation of the impeachment case. As a result, the actions the petitioner sought to stop had already been completed. The SC further held that the impeachment process had already moved to the Senate, which had convened as an impeachment court and had begun proceedings. Any ruling on the validity of the actions taken by the House and its Committee on Justice would no longer affect the controversy. While the SC recognized that it may, in exceptional cases, decide issues that have become moot, it found that none of the recognized exceptions applied in this case. Read the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170190. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://web.facebook.com/share/p/1ae5svYjFW/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified that a Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO) may be issued only in cases involving crimes punishable by a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment, or when the respondent is a foreigner, regardless of the penalty. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that a PHDO cannot be maintained when the crime under investigation does not meet these requirements. The case arose from a complaint for 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 and violation of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 22 (BP 22) filed against petitioner Faustine Feliz Abad (Abad) in connection with her purchase of airline tickets from respondent GHT Travel and Tours (GHT). The City Prosecutor found probable cause to charge Abad with two counts of violation of BP 22, but found insufficient evidence to charge her with 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢. Two Informations for BP 22 were then filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The prosecution also sought a PHDO against Abad with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that she was a flight risk. The RTC granted the request. Abad later sought to have the PHDO lifted. The RTC denied her request, noting, among others, that GHT had appealed the dismissal of the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge to the Secretary of Justice and that Abad was a permanent resident of the United States. Ruling that the PHDO should have been lifted, the SC cited the Rule on PHDO that it issued on August 7, 2018, which provides that a PHDO may be issued while a criminal complaint is undergoing preliminary investigation when the crime involved carries a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment. It may also be issued against a foreigner regardless of the penalty. The SC explained that the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge, which could have carried a penalty exceeding six years and one day, was dismissed for lack of probable cause. The only charges filed against Abad were two counts of BP 22 violations, each punishable by imprisonment of 30 days to one year. Thus, the BP 22 charges did not meet the penalty requirement for the issuance of a PHDO. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170320. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source:https://web.facebook.com/share/p/1D1qYYT7uh/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has ruled that employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled not only to full backwages but also to the remittance of their Social Security System (SSS) contributions. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division held that an employer’s obligation to remit SSS contributions continues during the period covered by an employee’s illegal dismissal. The case involved four employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) who were illegally dismissed. LSC was ordered to reinstate them to their former positions and pay them full backwages. After the ruling became final, the employees asked LSC to remit their SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages so they could qualify for retirement benefits. LSC refused, arguing that under the 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, its obligation to pay SSS contributions ended upon the employees’ separation from employment, regardless of whether their dismissal was legal or illegal. The Social Security Commission (SSC) rejected LSC’s position and ordered it to pay the contributions. The SSC ruled that because the employees were illegally dismissed, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to have continued during the period they were prevented from working. Holding that LSC remained obligated to remit the employees’ SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages, the SC stated that under Article 294 of the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits. The SC explained that such employees are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period. Since LSC failed to remit the illegally dismissed employees’ social security contributions, the SC held that LSC is liable to pay a penalty thereon of three percent per month, reckoned from the date they became due until full payment. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://web.facebook.com/share/p/1EUuU61CvN/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has declared unconstitutional the Department of Agriculture’s (DA) directive to commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to be tracked and monitored, and to report and send fisheries data, as it violates rights against unreasonable searches, seizures, due process, and equal protection under the law. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DA and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 266 unconstitutional for failing to pass the rational basis test. In 2020, the DA, through the BFAR, issued FAO No. 266 requiring all commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to adopt Vessel Monitoring Measures (VMM). These measures include a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to track and monitor vessels, and an Electronic Reporting System (ERS) to record and transmit fisheries data. FAO No. 266 also mandated the securing of Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers from the National Telecommunications Commission. Royale Fishing Corporation, Bonanza Fishing and Market Resources, Inc., and RBL Fishing Corporation (Royale Fishing et al.), operators of Philippine commercial fishing vessels, challenged FAO No. 266 before the RTC through a petition for declaratory relief. They argued that the continuous monitoring requirements violated their constitutional rights, exposed confidential business information and trade secrets, and denied them equal protection because only commercial fishing vessels were required to comply, even though the Fisheries Code also covers municipal and distant-water fishing vessels. The SC upheld the RTC’s ruling that FAO No. 266 is unconstitutional. It explained that courts apply different standards in reviewing government regulations. While stricter standards apply to regulations affecting fundamental rights and certain classifications, the rational basis test applies to cases that do not fall under those standards. Under this test, the government must show a legitimate interest and a reasonable connection between that interest and the methods used. The SC found the Republic failed this because it did not adequately prove that the VMS and ERS requirements were reasonably connected to preventing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In particular, the SC found that the VMS was not effective in detecting IUU fishing violations other than fishing within protected or restricted areas. It also noted that the expected output from VMS is no longer different from existing reporting requirements already being complied by the fishing vessels. The SC likewise ruled that FAO No. 266 authorized monitoring beyond what RA 8550, as amended, allows. The Fisheries Code defines “monitoring” as the continuous observation of fishing effort, expressed through factors such as “number of days or hours of fishing, characteristics of fishery resources, and resource yields.” According to the SC, this definition does not extend to the continuous tracking of the locations or destinations of commercial fishing vessels. It emphasized that RA 10654 does not require operators to disclose their location 24/7, recognizing that fishing grounds constitute proprietary business information. While recognizing that combating illegal fishing and protecting the country’s marine resources are legitimate and compelling State interests, the SC emphasized that these objectives cannot justify measures that unnecessarily infringe constitutional rights, particularly when the same goals may be achieved through lawful and less restrictive means. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170021 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://web.facebook.com/share/p/1Efe1oaCcw/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has reiterated that the loss or non-presentation of ransom money in court does not prevent a conviction for kidnapping for ransom, so long as the prosecution is able to prove that ransom was demanded for the victim’s release. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of Jose Olbato, PO3 Clayton Patingan, and others (the accused), except for SPO4 Romeo Ayson who died during the pendency of the appeal, for kidnapping for ransom. PO3 Patingan and SPO4 Ayson flagged Genevieve Ong Sy (Sy) while she was on board her car and, together with the other accused, forcibly took her and detained her in a house. They demanded PHP 50 million from her father in exchange for her release. After negotiations, the amount was reduced to PHP 500,000. Acting under police surveillance, Sy’s family driver delivered marked ransom money to the accused. The police then rescued Sy, arrested the accused, and recovered the marked money. The Regional Trial Court found that the accused worked together to kidnap and detain Sy for ransom. It rejected their defenses of denial and alibi. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Before the SC, the accused argued that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to present the ransom money in court after it was allegedly lost while in police custody. The SC disagreed and explained that kidnapping for ransom is committed when a private individual illegally kidnaps, detains, or deprives another of liberty for the purpose of demanding ransom. The SC stressed that actual payment or receipt of the ransom money is not important to prove the crime. In this case, the SC found that the prosecution proved that ransom was demanded, negotiated, and delivered. Sy’s father testified that the kidnappers called him repeatedly, demanding PHP 50 million for his daughter’s release, later reducing the amount to PHP 500,000 after negotiations. Evidence also showed that the ransom money was delivered and received during the police operation. The SC emphasized that the failure to present the ransom money in court did not disprove that ransom had been demanded and paid since the evidence clearly established both. The accused were sentenced to 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison. They were also ordered to pay the victim PHP 300,000 in civil indemnity and damages. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169311 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/191dt6XPKy/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that courts may determine whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case when necessary to resolve who has the right to possess a property. However, this finding is only provisional and applies solely to the ejectment case. In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division emphasized this ruling as it denied the appeal filed by Belinda E. Soriano and her relatives (collectively, Belinda and others) in an ejectment case filed against them by Antonio V. Estrella (Estrella). Estrella claimed ownership of a property in Quezon City where Belinda and others lived with his permission. When they refused his demand in 2012 to vacate the property so he could renovate it, Estrella filed an unlawful detainer case. Belinda and others argued that the case should be dismissed because Estrella supposedly lacked the legal capacity to sue, having died in 1990. They provided his death certificate as evidence. Ruling in Estrella’s favor, the SC held that Estrella had successfully overcome the presumption created by his death certificate. The parties themselves acknowledged that the Estrella who filed the case was the same Estrella named in the property’s title. Belinda and others never claimed that he was an impostor or disputed his identity. This, along with Estrella’s living presence, confirmed his legal capacity to sue. ​The SC clarified that while the proper remedy to cancel a death certificate or correct a civil registry entry is to file a petition for cancellation, this does not prevent courts hearing ejectment cases from provisionally determining whether a party is alive or dead when necessary to resolve the issue of possession. Accordingly, the SC held that a court’s finding on whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case is limited to determining that party’s legal capacity to sue and right to physical possession of the property. The SC also ruled that the requirements for unlawful detainer were met. Belinda and others initially had lawful possession of the property; however, it became unlawful once Estrella demanded that they vacate and they refused, leading him to file the case within the one-year period required by law. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171407. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CAhZFGabS/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

Upholding the right to free speech, the #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has dismissed petitions for indirect contempt arising from public statements critical of its 2025 decision in 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘷. 𝘏𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘴, which declared the fourth impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte unconstitutional. In a Decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the consolidated petitions against political analyst Richard J. Heydarian, Representative Percival Cendaña, and Presidential Adviser for Poverty Alleviation Secretary Lorenzo “Larry” G. Gadon (respondents). After the release of the decision in 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘷. 𝘏𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘴, Heydarian posted on X and Facebook that former President Rodrigo “𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘢𝘴 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘢𝘴 13 𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 15 𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘫𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘣𝘺 2022” while Rep. Cendaña posted a video on Facebook claiming that the Supreme Court disregarded the Constitution, its own decision and the principle of separation of powers, calling it “𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘥𝘭𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴.” Sec. Gadon, for his part, referred to the SC in media interviews as “𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘢 𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦.” These statements prompted Attys. Mark Kristopher G. Tolentino, Rolex Suplico, and Ferdinand S. Topacio to file petitions asking the SC to cite the respondents for indirect contempt. They claimed that the statements questioned the SC’s independence, undermined its decisions, and weakened public trust in the Judiciary. The SC, however, found that the statements did not amount to indirect contempt. Rule 71, Section 3 of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 punishes conduct that degrades the courts or damages their reputation. There must be a clear showing that the speaker intended to impede or obstruct the administration of justice. While contempt proceedings help protect judicial independence and public confidence in the Judiciary, the SC emphasized that courts must also respect and uphold the freedoms of speech, expression, and the press. The SC explained that political speech, which includes statements about government actions, public officials, and matters of public concern, enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection. It is not automatically punishable even if it is harsh or inaccurate. Applying the stricter incitement test, the SC said political speech may be restricted only if it is intended and likely to cause imminent lawless action. In making this determination, courts look beyond the literal meaning of the words and consider their performative aspect: the speaker’s intent, the context in which the speech was made, and its likely effect. Under this standard, a person may be held liable for contempt only if the speech advocates lawless conduct that threatens the administration of justice. Applying these principles, the SC found that the respondents’ statements were political speech relating to the impeachment case of Vice President Duterte, a matter of significant public interest involving public accountability. The SC found Heydarian’s post a fair comment on a matter of public interest and, when read together with his other posts, did not show bad faith, malice, or disrespect toward the SC. While the statement may have reflected bias, it remained protected speech. As for Rep. Cendaña’s remarks, the SC said although they were accusatory, they only showed his disappointment with the ruling and were not meant to interfere with the administration of justice. The SC considered his statements as expressions of opinion and an understandable reaction to an unfavorable decision. Finally, the SC found that while Sec. Gadon’s remark was disrespectful, it did not amount to contempt because it was not intended to interfere with court proceedings or influence any pending case. Instead, it was an expression of opinion on an issue that was widely debated by both supporters and critics of the SC’s decision. Respondents were reminded, however, to encourage thoughtful and constructive public discussion of Judiciary’s decision, to show greater respect, restraint and care in publicly criticizing the Judiciary, and to express their criticisms with civility and fairness. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169021 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/196nD64PRy/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) En Banc, during its session today, August 5, 2026, issued writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of petitioners Atty. Rey A. Gorgonio, Joselito B. Macapobre, Analyn S. Mirano, and Ma. Anabelle Ilustrisimo. Acting on G.R. No. E-05032 (In the matter of the petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of Atty. Rey A. Gorgonio et al. v. Lieutenant General Antonio G. Nafarrete et al.), the SC issued a temporary protection order directing Lieutenant General Antonio G. Nafarrete and others not to go within one kilometer of the petitioners and their immediate family members. The SC also directed respondent military and law enforcement officers to file, within 10 days of receipt of the order, a verified return containing their lawful defenses and other relevant information, as well as their comment on the petition, before the Court of Appeals (CA). The SC further instructed the CA to conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the petitioners are entitled to the privileges of the writs of amparo and habeas data. The CA was directed to decide the case within 10 days of its submission for resolution. In their petition, the petitioners alleged they were red-tagged by military and law enforcement agencies and falsely labeled as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army because of their human rights work and involvement with Paghida-et sa Kauswagan Development Group, Inc., a non-government organization supporting farmers and rural communities in Negros Island in their pursuit of genuine agrarian reform. Read the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170190. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source:https://web.facebook.com/share/p/1CyL8ncNvZ/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act). The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child. The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations. During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned. The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father. In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering. In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm. As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CygX1H15z/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that Koronadal City cannot stop a bus company from using its own private terminal and force it to use the city’s common terminal, as these would violate the company’s property rights. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 issued a writ of injunction against Koronadal City and its officials, prohibiting them from blocking and rerouting the buses of Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. (Yellow Bus) and requiring it to use the City of Koronadal Integrated Transport Terminal Complex (common terminal). Sangguniang Panlungsod of Koronadal City, through 𝘖𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘕𝘰. 9, 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 2018, created the common terminal to provide efficient transport services, reduce traffic congestion and pollution in the city’s business center, and generate revenue for public services. Yellow Bus filed a complaint for injunction to stop the implementation of the ordinance, arguing that the city unlawfully interfered with its right to use its own private terminal. It claimed that as a result, it has paid more than PHP 1 million in terminal fees while travel time of its buses increased by 20-25 minutes and dispatch times were disrupted. Koronadal City argued that after being designated as the administrative seat of Region XII, it was required to have a centralized transport terminal, as part of its valid exercise of its power to regulate traffic, promote public welfare, and generate revenue. Agreeing with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, the SC recognized Yellow Bus’ ownership rights to its private terminal, including the right to use and manage the property, as protected by the Constitution. The SC emphasized that an LGU’s exercise of police power is valid only if it aims to address a public concern and the methods used are reasonably necessary. In this case, forcing all PUVs to use the common terminal while effectively prohibiting private terminals was excessive and not reasonably necessary to achieve that goal. The SC said that the measures imposed by the city were too broad and excessive for their purpose. The city also did not prove that compelling PUVs to use the common terminal was the only solution to the traffic problem. The SC added that there is no legal basis to block Yellow Bus from using its own facility or to force rerouting, as the ordinance did not expressly mandate that all PUVs use the common terminal or prohibit private terminals. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167210 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/SupremeCourtPhilippines/posts/pfbid0NpSWn1Pv6wgUW3JESMmA8RNjeSfNPS268FRY7rp96VA2hU8E17L1HTzsjnGg91rcl This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court. In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22. The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed. The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it. The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor. The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service. To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor. 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court. If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents. The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer. Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts. The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service. In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served. The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest. In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CEuEhP6qZ/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) exceeded its authority when it issued a rule that excluded secondary beneficiaries from receiving survivorship benefits of deceased members who had at least three but less than 15 years of service. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division declared Section 24.2.2 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘐𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘙𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 (𝘐𝘙𝘙) of Republic Act No. 8291, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997 (𝘎𝘚𝘐𝘚 𝘈𝘤𝘵), 𝘶𝘭𝘵𝘳𝘢 𝘷𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘴 or beyond the GSIS’ rule-making authority. As a result, the GSIS is barred from enforcing the provision to the extent that it conflicts with Section 21(c) of the law. The case arose from the application of Petronilo B. Laroco (Laroco) for survivorship benefits following the death of his daughter, Cristie. She was a public school teacher with 13 years of government service and had paid GSIS premiums for 12 years. She died single and had no children. The GSIS rejected the application. Under Section 24.2 of the IRR, Laroco was ineligible for survivorship benefits because he was not a primary beneficiary. The GSIS held that secondary beneficiaries qualify for survivorship only if the deceased member had served at least 15 years in the government. Since Cristie had only 13 years of service, only her primary beneficiaries—such as her spouse or children—were entitled to survivorship benefits. Ruling in Laroco’s favor, the SC pointed out that Section 24.2.2 of the IRR conflicts with the law because it adds a new requirement—limiting survivorship benefits for secondary beneficiaries only to cases where the deceased member served at least 15 years. Under the 𝘎𝘚𝘐𝘚 𝘈𝘤𝘵, a secondary beneficiary is entitled to survivorship benefits if: (1) there is no primary beneficiary; (2) the secondary beneficiary meets the dependency requisites under the law; (3) the member was in government service at the time of their death; and (4) the member has rendered at least three years of service. The SC stressed that although the GSIS had good intentions to address the “unequal situation” under the law, it cannot simply change the 𝘎𝘚𝘐𝘚 𝘈𝘤𝘵 through a mere administrative issuance. The three-year government service requirement for survivorship benefit under Section 21 might be, as argued by the GSIS, unfair and disadvantageous to other members who are required to render at least 15 years of service before qualifying for pension, but this is what is provided in the law. The SC remanded the case to the GSIS Committee on Claims for the computation of the benefits payable to Laroco. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167839. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CQZHRHNZo/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell. Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund. The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957. The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers. The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws. The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://web.facebook.com/share/p/1C1xmfy25s/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has reiterated that an employee's absence from work, by itself, is not enough to prove abandonment or justify dismissal. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division found Green Era Biotech Corp. (Green Era Biotech) and Great Value Management and Services Corporation (Great Value) guilty of illegally dismissing production utility worker Alvin G. Carpio (Carpio). Carpio claimed he was originally hired by Green Era Biotech but was later transferred to its manpower service provider, Great Value. After he was absent from work at Green Era Biotech for eight straight days due to illness, Great Value issued him a notice to explain. He was warned that another similar violation would lead to an absence without leave (AWOL) notice. Carpio was later absent from work for another nine consecutive days. Great Value issued him an AWOL notice, stating that his continued absences were considered serious misconduct and abandonment of work. He later took another leave with his supervisor’s permission. However, when he returned to work the next day, he was barred from entering the workplace. A few days later, Carpio was informed he had been declared AWOL. Carpio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Ruling that Carpio was illegally dismissed, the SC reiterated that abandonment, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, requires proof of two elements: (1) the employee was absent without a valid reason; and (2) the employee clearly intended to end the employer-employee relationship. Of these, the second element is more important and must be shown through the employee’s actions. Since abandonment is a ground for dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving both elements. In this case, although Carpio’s absences were unauthorized, the SC found no evidence that he intended to abandon his job. Instead, he tried to return to work and immediately challenged his dismissal by filing a complaint. The SC ordered Carpio’s reinstatement but ruled that he was not entitled to backwages because his dismissal was made in good faith based on his unauthorized absences. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the companies must instead pay him separation pay. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168002. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CD9dCc67L/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that a husband and wife’s mutual desire to end their marriage, by itself, is not enough to prove collusion in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. A lack of objection is not the same as collusion. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that there was no collusion between the spouses in a petition to declare their marriage void. “Collusion” means that the spouses secretly agreed to fake or misrepresent facts in order to nullify their marriage. The SC voided the marriage due to the husband’s psychological incapacity. The wife filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that her husband was unable to fulfill his marital duties because of continued physical, psychological, and economic abuse, which she said began even before their marriage. When the husband did not file his answer to the petition, the RTC directed the Provincial Prosecutor to investigate possible collusion between the spouses. The Associate Provincial Prosecutor reported that there was no collusion. During trial, the wife presented several witnesses while the husband presented none. He also did not oppose the petition. Despite this, the RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the evidence did not sufficiently prove psychological incapacity. The RTC pointed out that the husband’s father admitted discussing his testimony with his son, and that the husband was willing to have the marriage dissolved. Explaining that collusion is a secret agreement to defraud or obtain something illegal, the SC noted that although the RTC observed suspicious circumstances, these did not clearly prove that the spouses conspired to fake grounds to nullify their marriage. The SC emphasized that a mutual desire to end the marriage does not automatically mean collusion. A spouse’s agreement or lack of objection is not the same as a secret scheme to mislead the court. Without proof that the spouses faked evidence or suppressed valid defenses, collusion cannot be established. It added that the husband’s failure to file an answer or present evidence does not, by itself, prove collusion. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168319. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EZnLxMrp4/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that homeowners’ associations (HOAs) may impose sanctions or penalties on members who fail to pay association dues, but it cannot deprive them of their right to use common areas, including subdivision roads. In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division dismissed the petition filed by the former directors and officers of La Costa Brava Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Association). Spouses Linley and Juvy Retirado failed to pay their monthly association dues from 2016 to 2021. Consequently, the Association declared them delinquent and enforced several penalties. Among the sanctions were banning of grass-cutting or maintenance within five meters from the property; reducing the frequency of garbage collection; prohibiting food, package, appliance, and gas deliveries to their residence; preventing taxis, tricycles, and ride-hailing vehicles from entering the subdivision to fetch them; barring guests from entering the subdivision to visit them; and imposing delivery fees on trucks and vehicles bringing supplies and materials to their construction site. The spouses filed a complaint before the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC), which ruled that the sanctions violated Republic Act No. (RA) 9904, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘔𝘢𝘨𝘯𝘢 𝘊𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘢 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘏𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘏𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘈𝘴𝘴𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴. The HSAC also permanently disqualified the officers responsible from holding any position in the Association. The officers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition. The SC affirmed the HSAC’s ruling on the penalties. Section 7(a) of RA 9904 grants homeowners two distinct rights: the right to enjoy basic community services and facilities, and the right to use common areas. The SC clarified that HOAs may impose sanctions on delinquent members under their bylaws. However, this authority is not absolute. HOAs can restrict delinquent members from accessing or enjoying certain community services and facilities, but they cannot deny the right to use common areas like roads. Applying this distinction, the SC held that restricting deliveries, transportation, and guests effectively violated the spouses’ right to use the subdivision roads. The SC also rejected the officers’ claim that their violation was not grave enough to warrant permanent disqualification from holding office in the Association. The SC ruled that restricting access to subdivision roads for basic needs such as the delivery of goods and transportation caused great harm and dangerous consequences—a violation serious and grave enough to justify the permanent disqualification. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-homeowners-associations.../ Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CDMxSrpDh/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012. In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual (XXX) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook. The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial. AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner XXX after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public. During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for XXX the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was XXX’s and that they received messages from him through the same account. Despite XXX’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting XXX, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment. Resolving XXX’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that XXX’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision: 𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩; 𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭; 𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞; 𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬; 𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫; 𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫 𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩. The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm. Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices. In this case, the Information alleged that XXX made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed XXX that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system. The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial. Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EnKHVtL7i/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 12079, which grants value-added tax (VAT) refunds on certain local purchases made by non-resident foreign tourists. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the petition filed by John Barry T. Tayam challenging the validity of the law. RA No. 12079 introduced Section 112-A of the 𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘶𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 1997, establishing a VAT refund system for non-resident foreign tourists who purchase goods in the Philippines but are meant to be consumed outside the country. The VAT refund applies to goods bought from duly accredited stores and taken out of the Philippines within 60 days from purchase. The value of the goods must be at least PHP 3,000 per transaction and Section 5 of the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations limits the refund to items intended for personal use. Tayam argued that the law violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection because it limits VAT refunds to foreign tourists and excludes Filipino citizens and residents. In dismissing the petition, the Court emphasized that equal protection does not require identical treatment for all persons. The Constitution permits different treatment for groups that are genuinely distinct, provided the classification is reasonable and related to the purpose of the law. The SC found that RA 12079 validly distinguishes foreign tourists from Filipino citizens and residents. The classification is directly related to the law’s objective of promoting tourism and encouraging visitors to purchase local products. Rather than discriminate against Filipinos, the law grants a specific incentive to foreign tourists as part of the State’s effort to strengthen the tourism industry. The SC also said the VAT refund system follows the basic rule of VAT that goods are taxed where they are consumed. Since the law requires foreign tourists to take the goods out of the Philippines within 60 days, the goods are considered to be consumed abroad and may qualify for a VAT refund. If the goods are consumed in the Philippines, they remain subject to Philippine VAT. The SC also rejected claims that the law unfairly disadvantages foreigners with long-term visas. It explained that non-resident foreigners may still qualify for the VAT refund, even if they stay in the Philippines for an extended period, as long as they take the goods out of the country within 60 days and consume them abroad. The SC added that VAT refund programs for foreign tourists are widely practiced around the world. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168521 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DRTEqtQAv/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

he #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified when the processing periods begin for value-added tax (VAT) refund claims. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division updated the summary of rules on the reckoning of the processing periods will start for VAT refund claims under Section 112(A) of the 𝘛𝘢𝘹 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which was previously explained in the case of 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘶𝘦 (𝘊𝘐𝘙) 𝘷. 𝘋𝘰𝘩𝘭𝘦 𝘚𝘩𝘪𝘱𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 𝘊𝘰𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, based on changing policies. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗼 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟭𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰, the 120-day period starts from the date of the filing of the administrative claim once the taxpayer submits complete documents with the claim or manifests that they will no longer submit additional supporting documents. If the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) does not notify the taxpayer that their documents are incomplete, the 120-day period begins from the taxpayer’s submission. If the BIR notifies the taxpayer that additional documents are needed, the 120-day period begins from the submission or the end of the 30-day period given to submit additional documents.� - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟭𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰 𝘁𝗼 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟯𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟳, the 120-day period begins from the date of filing of the administrative claim for refund with complete supporting documents. The taxpayer is not allowed to submit additional documents after the filing of the claim. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟴 𝘁𝗼 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟭𝟴, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟭, the 𝘛𝘢𝘹 𝘙𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘓𝘢𝘸 (𝘛𝘙𝘈𝘐𝘕 𝘓𝘢𝘸) shortened the 120-day period for the CIR to process administrative claims for VAT refund to 90 days. The 90-day period begins from the submission of the official receipts or invoices and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund. If the documents are incomplete, the application will not be accepted. Any unsupported claim shall be outrightly disallowed, resulting in full or partial denial of the claim. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟭𝟵, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟭 𝘁𝗼 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟯𝟬, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟯, the 90-day period begins from the submission of the official receipts or invoices and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund. A 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 (𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵) was released by the BIR as basis for the completeness of the submitted documents. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗝𝘂𝗹𝘆 𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟯 𝘁𝗼 𝗢𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟭𝟳, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟰, the 90-day period begins from the submission of the official receipts or invoices and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund, as provided in the 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗢𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟭𝟴, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟰 𝘁𝗼 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵 𝟯𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱, the 90-day period begins from the acceptance by the processing office of the claim or application for VAT refund with complete documents, as provided in the 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵. Applications with incomplete documents will not be accepted. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗔𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗹 𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱 𝗼𝗻𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗱𝘀, the 90-day period begins from the submission of the certified true copies of the invoices or official receipts and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund, as provided in the 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵. If documents are incomplete, the application will not be received and processed by the processing office. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167773. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AfyJFgrrP/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that Flying Risk Pay (FRP) under Republic Act No. (RA) 776, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘈𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, may be granted only to Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) personnel whose duties are directly related to flight operations. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of FRP paid to certain CAAP officials and employees whose duties were primarily managerial, administrative, or financial. Under Section 30 of RA 776, CAAP-licensed airmen and other authorized personnel who are required to make regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties may receive FRP equivalent to 50% of their salary, provided they complete at least four hours of flight time per month. In 2011, CAAP granted FRP to officials and employees who met the four-hour monthly flight requirement. Some recipients, however, held managerial, administrative, and finance positions and traveled by air mainly to attend conferences, seminars, public hearings, inspections, and similar activities. COA disallowed PHP 323,579.50 in FRP payments, finding that the benefit was intended for personnel whose duties involved aerial and flight operations. The recipients argued that they were entitled to FRP because RA 776 covers not only “airmen” but also “other authorized personnel,” even if their duties were not directly related to flight operations. The SC upheld the disallowance. Citing RA 776, which defines an “airman” as a pilot, mechanic, flight radio operator, aircraft crew member, or a person responsible for inspecting, maintaining, or repairing aircraft,” the SC clarified that the phrase “other authorized personnel” refers to personnel who are required to perform regular and frequent aerial flights as part of their official duties. The SC also cited the 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘭, which limits FRP to personnel whose duties are inherent in flight operations and excludes those who fly merely as passengers. In this case, the recipient’s air travel was only incidental to their managerial, administrative, or financial duties. Their flights were for meetings, conferences, inspections, and other administrative activities, rather than for flight operations. As passengers, they were not entitled to FPR. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171845. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1KnSuLUB6o/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that an affidavit of desistance, or a sworn statement withdrawing a complaint, is considered “highly suspect” when made by a victim of exploitation and cannot be used as a basis to dismiss a trafficking case. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division affirmed the conviction of a woman for qualified trafficking in persons involving a minor. The SC sentenced her to life imprisonment, imposed a fine of PHP 2,000,000, and ordered her to pay PHP 600,000 in damages. The woman, who was the minor’s neighbor, recruited the minor to provide sexual services to a man in exchange for money. The minor received PHP 15,000 from the man for the sexual act, but the woman later took the money. The woman also bought the minor a cellphone and gave her PHP 3,000. The minor’s mother discovered the incident and filed a complaint against the woman. The minor testified in court but later signed an affidavit of desistance to withdraw the charges. During cross-examination, the minor admitted that she accepted PHP 30,000 to sign the affidavit prepared by the woman’s counsel. When the trial court questioned her further, the minor maintained that her earlier testimony was true. Sustaining the woman’s conviction of qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, or the 𝗔𝗻𝘁𝗶-𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟯, as amended, SC held that human trafficking cases should not be dismissed based on the affidavits of desistance executed by the victims or their parents or legal guardians. The SC explained that affidavits of desistance by victims of exploitation should be treated with caution, as they may have been made under coercion, pressure, or undue influence. This is especially true when the victims are children, who may not fully understand the consequences of withdrawing their testimony. The SC further stressed that once a criminal case has been filed in court, the complainant can no longer decide whether the case should proceed. The State has an interest in prosecuting the crime and is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action. Thus, an affidavit of desistance, especially one executed while trial is ongoing, does not, by itself, justify dismissal of the case. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172431 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1F1cmejyn8/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has suspended a lawyer for using vulgar words in a social media post. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division found Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III guilty of simple misconduct and suspended him from the practice of law for one year. The case arose from a Twitter post made by Atty. Falcis defending his brother, Nicko, against accusations related to a qualified theft complaint filed by Kris Aquino (Aquino): “𝘠𝘶𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘣𝘪𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘯𝘢 𝘥𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘢𝘯 𝘥𝘺𝘢𝘯, 𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘢 𝘬𝘢𝘺𝘰. 𝘚𝘢 𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘯𝘪 𝘒𝘳𝘪𝘴, 𝘱𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘯𝘨 𝘱𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘢 𝘯𝘢 𝘬𝘢𝘺𝘰 𝘢𝘨𝘢𝘥. 𝘗𝘦𝘳𝘰 𝘴𝘢 𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘯𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘯 𝘯𝘢 𝘴𝘩𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘮𝘺 𝘣𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳, 𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘢 𝘢𝘬𝘰 𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘨 𝘴𝘢 𝘪𝘯𝘺𝘰? 𝘗𝘢𝘬𝘺𝘶 𝘬𝘢𝘺𝘰 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘨𝘢𝘨𝘰 𝘩𝘢𝘩𝘢 𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘺𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘣𝘪𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘴.” Jason Gene Baltao (Baltao), Aquino’s former business partner, filed a complaint against Atty. Falcis before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Atty. Falcis argued that previous SC rulings held that the phrase “𝘱𝘶𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯𝘢” is often used to express anger or frustration, not to defame. He also claimed that lawyers are entitled to freedom of speech and expression. The IBP found that Atty. Falcis violated the 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈) by using offensive language and recommended a penalty of a fine and reprimand. The SC agreed with the IBP’s findings but imposed a heavier penalty of suspension. Under Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA, lawyers must use dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in both their professional and personal dealings. They must not use abusive, offensive, or improper language, whether spoken or written, including on social media. Such conduct undermines the dignity of the legal profession. Section 37 of the same Canon requires lawyers to ensure that their online posts—whether public or shared within a limited audience—uphold the dignity of the profession, protect it from disrepute, and maintain respect for the law. Section 36 also requires lawyers to understand the benefits, risks, and ethical implications of using social media. Ruling that Atty. Falcis failed to meet these standards, the SC stressed that he should have understood the risks and consequences of his statements on social media, including how they can spread widely, reach all kinds of audiences, and influence both lawyers and non-lawyers, including children. The SC held that the lawyer’s oath and their duties and responsibilities serve as the limit of free speech for lawyers. The SC also reminded lawyers of the nature of social media, which encompasses a wide audience and may not easily be restricted. The SC explained that Atty. Falcis’ actions amounted to misconduct, defined as intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule or standard of behavior, whether work-related or not. It is considered simple misconduct if there is no corruption or clear intent to violate the law. The SC increased the penalty from a fine to suspension due to Atty. Falcis’ prior administrative violations, including direct and indirect contempt, and the seriousness of his use of profane and offensive language. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167468 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/16wsjthnjP/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has ruled that similarities in trademark or logo designs that may confuse purchasers prevent the registration of later marks, even if new words are added. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division granted Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC’s (Starwood) consolidated petitions and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) rulings allowing the registration of Oceanic Empire Limited’s (Oceanic) marks. Oceanic filed to register the trademarks “𝐖 𝐆𝐋𝐎𝐁𝐀𝐋𝐂𝐄𝐍𝐓𝐄𝐑” and “𝐖 𝐅𝐈𝐅𝐓𝐇 𝐀𝐕𝐄𝐍𝐔𝐄” and had earlier secured registration for “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑.” Starwood, owner of several registered "𝐖” trademarks for hotels and entertainment services, opposed the applications and sought the cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑,” arguing that Oceanic’s marks were confusingly similar to its trademarks. Starwood argued that Oceanic would benefit from the popularity and reputation of its brand and that this would mislead the public into believing that Oceanic’s business was connected with Starwood. Ruling in favor of Starwood, the SC explained that trademark protection prevents confusion of goods and businesses, and that only the likelihood, not actual proof, of confusion is required. Each case must be assessed based on the resemblance of the marks and the relatedness of the services. Under the 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗧𝗲𝘀𝘁, emphasis is placed on the dominant or most striking features of the marks rather than on minor differences. In this case, the SC ruled that "𝐖" is the dominant feature of both Starwood’s and Oceanic’s marks. While Starwood’s "𝐖" is registered as a word mark, the Court clarified that Starwood cannot claim the letter "𝐖," but only its distinct stylized version. The Court stressed that purchasers would immediately notice the similarity between the parties’ "𝐖" marks. It held that minor textual differences do not change the fact that both use the same style, which looks visually similar. The SC thus directed the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks to deny Oceanic’s application for registration of trademark, and to grant Starwood’s petition for cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑” mark. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166975. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/194QBdnYhk/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The Supreme Court (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, August 12, 2026, dismissed the petition seeking to compel the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee) to release the full, unredacted text of the draft partial committee report on the alleged irregularities in flood-control projects nationwide. Acting on 𝘈𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘯, 𝘦𝘵 𝘢𝘭. 𝘷. 𝘚𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘉𝘭𝘶𝘦 𝘙𝘪𝘣𝘣𝘰𝘯 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘦 (G.R. No. E-04961), the SC found no constitutional or legal obligation for the Committee to release an unfinished draft report. It clarified that a draft report is a preliminary document and only becomes part of the official Senate record once it is finalized, approved by the Committee, and submitted to the Senate plenary following the Senate’s internal rules. Since no law requires the Committee to release an unfinished draft report, mandamus cannot be used to compel its disclosure. The SC explained that mandamus may be used only to compel a public official or body to perform a ministerial duty clearly required by law that involves no discretion. The SC rejected the petitioners’ claim that the Committee’s refusal to release the draft report violated their constitutional right to information. It stressed that the right to information is not absolute. It is subject to recognized limitations, including the deliberative process privilege. This privilege protects internal discussions while a decision is still being made, allowing officials to freely exchange views without the risk that preliminary or tentative positions will be mistaken for final decisions. The SC further emphasized the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Courts generally cannot interfere with matters that fall within the Legislature’s discretion or with the internal procedures of Congress, as long as these are exercised within constitutional limits. The petition for mandamus and certiorari was filed by Atty. Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron and other members of the Philippine Bar following the leak of a draft partial committee report to several media outlets last February. The alleged leaked draft reportedly recommended the filing of criminal and administrative charges, including plunder, against several Senators and other public officials. READ the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170865 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://web.facebook.com/share/p/18QfD7kH4k/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s acts creating a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse, their children, and common children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct” under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 which serves as a ground for legal separation. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division granted the petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife, after finding that her actions constituted grossly abusive conduct under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦. The couple married in 2003 and later had two children. To support their family, the wife started selling coffee, but they still faced financial hardships. The husband studied nursing with hopes of eventually relocating their family abroad. However, his plan to move abroad never materialized. During the marriage, the husband claimed he faced various abusive behaviors from his wife. He reported that she controlled their finances and refused to provide financial help, even when he needed treatment for his toothache and was advised to get a root canal. The husband also claimed that at a party, his wife told their friends she wanted to cut off his penis because they were no longer having sex. He also alleged that she shared stories about him with family and friends, often twisting the facts to make him look bad. The husband also said that his wife refused marriage counseling, prohibited him from seeing his friends, manipulated their children to force him to provide more financial support, and maintained a controlling attitude throughout their marriage. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for legal separation after finding that the wife’s behavior amounted to grossly abusive conduct. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that their disagreements were ordinary marital disputes. The SC affirmed the RTC defining acts constituting “grossly abusive conduct”, which is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, to include those acts by a spouse that create a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse or the children. The SC also stressed that courts must decide this issue on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts and evidence presented. While the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 does not allow absolute divorce, spouses may legally separate by order of a court without ending their marriage. Unlike a declaration that a marriage is void, a legal separation does not break the marital bond. Among the grounds for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 is repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against the spouse, their common child, or the spouse’s child. The SC added that this interpretation is consistent with the State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage as a basic social institution. In this case, the SC found that the wife’s actions, taken together, created a hostile and intimidating environment for the husband. He was made to constantly follow her lead, and his efforts to fix the marriage through counseling and other interventions were unsuccessful. Witnesses also confirmed her controlling behavior, which supported the finding of a hostile home environment. Because of this, the SC ruled that the husband was justified in seeking reassignment to another province to distance himself from the situation at home. The SC granted the legal separation and sent the case back to the RTC for the dissolution and division of the couple’s property. It also directed the RTC to decide on the custody and support of their children. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BGfS7M48Y/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has dismissed the consolidated petitions challenging the 𝘕𝘰 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘈𝘱𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 (𝘕𝘊𝘈𝘗) in Metro Manila, ruling that the issues raised have become moot because of the adoption of a new and uniform traffic enforcement framework under the 𝘔𝘦𝘵𝘳𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘢 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 2023 (𝘔𝘔𝘛𝘊 2023). In addition to mootness, the petitions were also dismissed for lack of standing, violation of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, and forum-shopping. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the SC dismissed the petitions filed by Kilusan sa Pagbabago ng Industriya ng Transportasyon and others. The petitions sought to declare unconstitutional ordinances of Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, and the City of Manila implementing 𝘔𝘦𝘵𝘳𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘢 𝘋𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘔𝘔𝘋𝘈) 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘕𝘰. 16-01, which established NCAP. The NCAP seeks to ease traffic and reduce corruption through the use of digital cameras to detect traffic violations. The petitioners argue that NCAP is inconsistent with 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 4136 𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which contemplates direct, face-to-face apprehension of violators and places responsibility on the actual driver rather than the registered vehicle owner. They also claim that NCAP violates due process because motorists may receive penalties without immediate notice or an opportunity to contest the violation when it occurs, which can result in fines accumulating before they are informed. The SC ruled that the issues had been overtaken by later developments. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires courts to refrain from resolving constitutional questions where a case may be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. Here, the traffic enforcement framework has since been changed by MMTC 2023, which is not being challenged in the present set of cases. The SC noted that MMTC 2023 adopted by the Metro Manila Council established a uniform framework for traffic regulation and NCAP implementation across Metro Manila. It provides a uniform traffic adjudication system, procedures before traffic adjudication boards, periods for settling notices of violation, guidelines for tagging violations in the Land Transportation Office’s (LTO) Land Transportation Management System, data privacy safeguards, uniform fines and penalties, recognized online payment platforms, and rules on the mandatory authorization process. The MMDA later issued 𝘔𝘦𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘮 𝘊𝘪𝘳𝘤𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘳 𝘕𝘰. 10, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 2025, to implement MMTC 2023, which was adopted by Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, and Valenzuela City through new ordinances. The City of Manila also enacted an ordinance adopting the MMTC 2023, except the provision on the establishment of a Traffic Adjudication Board since its own Traffic Adjudication Board continues to perform its functions. The SC said these developments effectively replaced the fragmented NCAP systems challenged in the petitions. Since neither MMTC 2023 nor the new ordinances were being challenged before the Court, any ruling on the validity of the old ordinances would have no practical or legal effect. Although exceptions exist to allow the Court to resolve an otherwise moot case, such as when there is a grave violation of the Constitution, significant public interest, a need to formulate guiding principles, or when the case is likely to recur and evade review, none of these were present in this case. The SC added that the dismissal does not bar future challenges if the revised NCAP system later gives rise to an actual controversy. The SC also lifted the temporary restraining order it issued on August 30, 2022, against the City of Manila, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, Parañaque City, Muntinlupa City, the LTO, and all parties acting for and on their behalf. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168727 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EPCcowGuS/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence. The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch. The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven. Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence. Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake. The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled. SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account. The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks. The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BxKYcpRX8/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.” The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor. The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible. Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned. The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes. The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term. The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court. However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns. The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner. The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available. Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DbZmBwHqt/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.