The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has reiterated that the loss or non-presentation of ransom money in court does not prevent a conviction for kidnapping for ransom, so long as the prosecution is able to prove that ransom was demanded for the victim’s release. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of Jose Olbato, PO3 Clayton Patingan, and others (the accused), except for SPO4 Romeo Ayson who died during the pendency of the appeal, for kidnapping for ransom. PO3 Patingan and SPO4 Ayson flagged Genevieve Ong Sy (Sy) while she was on board her car and, together with the other accused, forcibly took her and detained her in a house. They demanded PHP 50 million from her father in exchange for her release. After negotiations, the amount was reduced to PHP 500,000. Acting under police surveillance, Sy’s family driver delivered marked ransom money to the accused. The police then rescued Sy, arrested the accused, and recovered the marked money. The Regional Trial Court found that the accused worked together to kidnap and detain Sy for ransom. It rejected their defenses of denial and alibi. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Before the SC, the accused argued that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to present the ransom money in court after it was allegedly lost while in police custody. The SC disagreed and explained that kidnapping for ransom is committed when a private individual illegally kidnaps, detains, or deprives another of liberty for the purpose of demanding ransom. The SC stressed that actual payment or receipt of the ransom money is not important to prove the crime. In this case, the SC found that the prosecution proved that ransom was demanded, negotiated, and delivered. Sy’s father testified that the kidnappers called him repeatedly, demanding PHP 50 million for his daughter’s release, later reducing the amount to PHP 500,000 after negotiations. Evidence also showed that the ransom money was delivered and received during the police operation. The SC emphasized that the failure to present the ransom money in court did not disprove that ransom had been demanded and paid since the evidence clearly established both. The accused were sentenced to 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison. They were also ordered to pay the victim PHP 300,000 in civil indemnity and damages. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169311 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/191dt6XPKy/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

Upholding the right to free speech, the #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has dismissed petitions for indirect contempt arising from public statements critical of its 2025 decision in 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘷. 𝘏𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘴, which declared the fourth impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte unconstitutional. In a Decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the consolidated petitions against political analyst Richard J. Heydarian, Representative Percival Cendaña, and Presidential Adviser for Poverty Alleviation Secretary Lorenzo “Larry” G. Gadon (respondents). After the release of the decision in 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘷. 𝘏𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘴, Heydarian posted on X and Facebook that former President Rodrigo “𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘢𝘴 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘢𝘴 13 𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 15 𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘫𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘣𝘺 2022” while Rep. Cendaña posted a video on Facebook claiming that the Supreme Court disregarded the Constitution, its own decision and the principle of separation of powers, calling it “𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘥𝘭𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴.” Sec. Gadon, for his part, referred to the SC in media interviews as “𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘢 𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘋𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘦.” These statements prompted Attys. Mark Kristopher G. Tolentino, Rolex Suplico, and Ferdinand S. Topacio to file petitions asking the SC to cite the respondents for indirect contempt. They claimed that the statements questioned the SC’s independence, undermined its decisions, and weakened public trust in the Judiciary. The SC, however, found that the statements did not amount to indirect contempt. Rule 71, Section 3 of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 punishes conduct that degrades the courts or damages their reputation. There must be a clear showing that the speaker intended to impede or obstruct the administration of justice. While contempt proceedings help protect judicial independence and public confidence in the Judiciary, the SC emphasized that courts must also respect and uphold the freedoms of speech, expression, and the press. The SC explained that political speech, which includes statements about government actions, public officials, and matters of public concern, enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection. It is not automatically punishable even if it is harsh or inaccurate. Applying the stricter incitement test, the SC said political speech may be restricted only if it is intended and likely to cause imminent lawless action. In making this determination, courts look beyond the literal meaning of the words and consider their performative aspect: the speaker’s intent, the context in which the speech was made, and its likely effect. Under this standard, a person may be held liable for contempt only if the speech advocates lawless conduct that threatens the administration of justice. Applying these principles, the SC found that the respondents’ statements were political speech relating to the impeachment case of Vice President Duterte, a matter of significant public interest involving public accountability. The SC found Heydarian’s post a fair comment on a matter of public interest and, when read together with his other posts, did not show bad faith, malice, or disrespect toward the SC. While the statement may have reflected bias, it remained protected speech. As for Rep. Cendaña’s remarks, the SC said although they were accusatory, they only showed his disappointment with the ruling and were not meant to interfere with the administration of justice. The SC considered his statements as expressions of opinion and an understandable reaction to an unfavorable decision. Finally, the SC found that while Sec. Gadon’s remark was disrespectful, it did not amount to contempt because it was not intended to interfere with court proceedings or influence any pending case. Instead, it was an expression of opinion on an issue that was widely debated by both supporters and critics of the SC’s decision. Respondents were reminded, however, to encourage thoughtful and constructive public discussion of Judiciary’s decision, to show greater respect, restraint and care in publicly criticizing the Judiciary, and to express their criticisms with civility and fairness. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169021 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/196nD64PRy/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012. In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual (XXX) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook. The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial. AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner XXX after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public. During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for XXX the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was XXX’s and that they received messages from him through the same account. Despite XXX’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting XXX, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment. Resolving XXX’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that XXX’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision: 𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩; 𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭; 𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞; 𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬; 𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫; 𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫 𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩. The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm. Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices. In this case, the Information alleged that XXX made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed XXX that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system. The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial. Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EnKHVtL7i/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has dismissed the consolidated petitions challenging the 𝘕𝘰 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘈𝘱𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 (𝘕𝘊𝘈𝘗) in Metro Manila, ruling that the issues raised have become moot because of the adoption of a new and uniform traffic enforcement framework under the 𝘔𝘦𝘵𝘳𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘢 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 2023 (𝘔𝘔𝘛𝘊 2023). In addition to mootness, the petitions were also dismissed for lack of standing, violation of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, and forum-shopping. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the SC dismissed the petitions filed by Kilusan sa Pagbabago ng Industriya ng Transportasyon and others. The petitions sought to declare unconstitutional ordinances of Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, and the City of Manila implementing 𝘔𝘦𝘵𝘳𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘢 𝘋𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘔𝘔𝘋𝘈) 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘕𝘰. 16-01, which established NCAP. The NCAP seeks to ease traffic and reduce corruption through the use of digital cameras to detect traffic violations. The petitioners argue that NCAP is inconsistent with 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 4136 𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which contemplates direct, face-to-face apprehension of violators and places responsibility on the actual driver rather than the registered vehicle owner. They also claim that NCAP violates due process because motorists may receive penalties without immediate notice or an opportunity to contest the violation when it occurs, which can result in fines accumulating before they are informed. The SC ruled that the issues had been overtaken by later developments. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires courts to refrain from resolving constitutional questions where a case may be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. Here, the traffic enforcement framework has since been changed by MMTC 2023, which is not being challenged in the present set of cases. The SC noted that MMTC 2023 adopted by the Metro Manila Council established a uniform framework for traffic regulation and NCAP implementation across Metro Manila. It provides a uniform traffic adjudication system, procedures before traffic adjudication boards, periods for settling notices of violation, guidelines for tagging violations in the Land Transportation Office’s (LTO) Land Transportation Management System, data privacy safeguards, uniform fines and penalties, recognized online payment platforms, and rules on the mandatory authorization process. The MMDA later issued 𝘔𝘦𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘮 𝘊𝘪𝘳𝘤𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘳 𝘕𝘰. 10, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 2025, to implement MMTC 2023, which was adopted by Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, and Valenzuela City through new ordinances. The City of Manila also enacted an ordinance adopting the MMTC 2023, except the provision on the establishment of a Traffic Adjudication Board since its own Traffic Adjudication Board continues to perform its functions. The SC said these developments effectively replaced the fragmented NCAP systems challenged in the petitions. Since neither MMTC 2023 nor the new ordinances were being challenged before the Court, any ruling on the validity of the old ordinances would have no practical or legal effect. Although exceptions exist to allow the Court to resolve an otherwise moot case, such as when there is a grave violation of the Constitution, significant public interest, a need to formulate guiding principles, or when the case is likely to recur and evade review, none of these were present in this case. The SC added that the dismissal does not bar future challenges if the revised NCAP system later gives rise to an actual controversy. The SC also lifted the temporary restraining order it issued on August 30, 2022, against the City of Manila, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, Parañaque City, Muntinlupa City, the LTO, and all parties acting for and on their behalf. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168727 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EPCcowGuS/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 12079, which grants value-added tax (VAT) refunds on certain local purchases made by non-resident foreign tourists. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the petition filed by John Barry T. Tayam challenging the validity of the law. RA No. 12079 introduced Section 112-A of the 𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘶𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 1997, establishing a VAT refund system for non-resident foreign tourists who purchase goods in the Philippines but are meant to be consumed outside the country. The VAT refund applies to goods bought from duly accredited stores and taken out of the Philippines within 60 days from purchase. The value of the goods must be at least PHP 3,000 per transaction and Section 5 of the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations limits the refund to items intended for personal use. Tayam argued that the law violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection because it limits VAT refunds to foreign tourists and excludes Filipino citizens and residents. In dismissing the petition, the Court emphasized that equal protection does not require identical treatment for all persons. The Constitution permits different treatment for groups that are genuinely distinct, provided the classification is reasonable and related to the purpose of the law. The SC found that RA 12079 validly distinguishes foreign tourists from Filipino citizens and residents. The classification is directly related to the law’s objective of promoting tourism and encouraging visitors to purchase local products. Rather than discriminate against Filipinos, the law grants a specific incentive to foreign tourists as part of the State’s effort to strengthen the tourism industry. The SC also said the VAT refund system follows the basic rule of VAT that goods are taxed where they are consumed. Since the law requires foreign tourists to take the goods out of the Philippines within 60 days, the goods are considered to be consumed abroad and may qualify for a VAT refund. If the goods are consumed in the Philippines, they remain subject to Philippine VAT. The SC also rejected claims that the law unfairly disadvantages foreigners with long-term visas. It explained that non-resident foreigners may still qualify for the VAT refund, even if they stay in the Philippines for an extended period, as long as they take the goods out of the country within 60 days and consume them abroad. The SC added that VAT refund programs for foreign tourists are widely practiced around the world. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168521 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DRTEqtQAv/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that a husband and wife’s mutual desire to end their marriage, by itself, is not enough to prove collusion in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. A lack of objection is not the same as collusion. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that there was no collusion between the spouses in a petition to declare their marriage void. “Collusion” means that the spouses secretly agreed to fake or misrepresent facts in order to nullify their marriage. The SC voided the marriage due to the husband’s psychological incapacity. The wife filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that her husband was unable to fulfill his marital duties because of continued physical, psychological, and economic abuse, which she said began even before their marriage. When the husband did not file his answer to the petition, the RTC directed the Provincial Prosecutor to investigate possible collusion between the spouses. The Associate Provincial Prosecutor reported that there was no collusion. During trial, the wife presented several witnesses while the husband presented none. He also did not oppose the petition. Despite this, the RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the evidence did not sufficiently prove psychological incapacity. The RTC pointed out that the husband’s father admitted discussing his testimony with his son, and that the husband was willing to have the marriage dissolved. Explaining that collusion is a secret agreement to defraud or obtain something illegal, the SC noted that although the RTC observed suspicious circumstances, these did not clearly prove that the spouses conspired to fake grounds to nullify their marriage. The SC emphasized that a mutual desire to end the marriage does not automatically mean collusion. A spouse’s agreement or lack of objection is not the same as a secret scheme to mislead the court. Without proof that the spouses faked evidence or suppressed valid defenses, collusion cannot be established. It added that the husband’s failure to file an answer or present evidence does not, by itself, prove collusion. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168319. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EZnLxMrp4/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has reiterated that an employee's absence from work, by itself, is not enough to prove abandonment or justify dismissal. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division found Green Era Biotech Corp. (Green Era Biotech) and Great Value Management and Services Corporation (Great Value) guilty of illegally dismissing production utility worker Alvin G. Carpio (Carpio). Carpio claimed he was originally hired by Green Era Biotech but was later transferred to its manpower service provider, Great Value. After he was absent from work at Green Era Biotech for eight straight days due to illness, Great Value issued him a notice to explain. He was warned that another similar violation would lead to an absence without leave (AWOL) notice. Carpio was later absent from work for another nine consecutive days. Great Value issued him an AWOL notice, stating that his continued absences were considered serious misconduct and abandonment of work. He later took another leave with his supervisor’s permission. However, when he returned to work the next day, he was barred from entering the workplace. A few days later, Carpio was informed he had been declared AWOL. Carpio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Ruling that Carpio was illegally dismissed, the SC reiterated that abandonment, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, requires proof of two elements: (1) the employee was absent without a valid reason; and (2) the employee clearly intended to end the employer-employee relationship. Of these, the second element is more important and must be shown through the employee’s actions. Since abandonment is a ground for dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving both elements. In this case, although Carpio’s absences were unauthorized, the SC found no evidence that he intended to abandon his job. Instead, he tried to return to work and immediately challenged his dismissal by filing a complaint. The SC ordered Carpio’s reinstatement but ruled that he was not entitled to backwages because his dismissal was made in good faith based on his unauthorized absences. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the companies must instead pay him separation pay. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168002. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CD9dCc67L/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) exceeded its authority when it issued a rule that excluded secondary beneficiaries from receiving survivorship benefits of deceased members who had at least three but less than 15 years of service. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division declared Section 24.2.2 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘐𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘙𝘦𝘨𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 (𝘐𝘙𝘙) of Republic Act No. 8291, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘐𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997 (𝘎𝘚𝘐𝘚 𝘈𝘤𝘵), 𝘶𝘭𝘵𝘳𝘢 𝘷𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘴 or beyond the GSIS’ rule-making authority. As a result, the GSIS is barred from enforcing the provision to the extent that it conflicts with Section 21(c) of the law. The case arose from the application of Petronilo B. Laroco (Laroco) for survivorship benefits following the death of his daughter, Cristie. She was a public school teacher with 13 years of government service and had paid GSIS premiums for 12 years. She died single and had no children. The GSIS rejected the application. Under Section 24.2 of the IRR, Laroco was ineligible for survivorship benefits because he was not a primary beneficiary. The GSIS held that secondary beneficiaries qualify for survivorship only if the deceased member had served at least 15 years in the government. Since Cristie had only 13 years of service, only her primary beneficiaries—such as her spouse or children—were entitled to survivorship benefits. Ruling in Laroco’s favor, the SC pointed out that Section 24.2.2 of the IRR conflicts with the law because it adds a new requirement—limiting survivorship benefits for secondary beneficiaries only to cases where the deceased member served at least 15 years. Under the 𝘎𝘚𝘐𝘚 𝘈𝘤𝘵, a secondary beneficiary is entitled to survivorship benefits if: (1) there is no primary beneficiary; (2) the secondary beneficiary meets the dependency requisites under the law; (3) the member was in government service at the time of their death; and (4) the member has rendered at least three years of service. The SC stressed that although the GSIS had good intentions to address the “unequal situation” under the law, it cannot simply change the 𝘎𝘚𝘐𝘚 𝘈𝘤𝘵 through a mere administrative issuance. The three-year government service requirement for survivorship benefit under Section 21 might be, as argued by the GSIS, unfair and disadvantageous to other members who are required to render at least 15 years of service before qualifying for pension, but this is what is provided in the law. The SC remanded the case to the GSIS Committee on Claims for the computation of the benefits payable to Laroco. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167839. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CQZHRHNZo/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

he #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified when the processing periods begin for value-added tax (VAT) refund claims. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division updated the summary of rules on the reckoning of the processing periods will start for VAT refund claims under Section 112(A) of the 𝘛𝘢𝘹 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which was previously explained in the case of 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘶𝘦 (𝘊𝘐𝘙) 𝘷. 𝘋𝘰𝘩𝘭𝘦 𝘚𝘩𝘪𝘱𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 𝘊𝘰𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, based on changing policies. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗼 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟭𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰, the 120-day period starts from the date of the filing of the administrative claim once the taxpayer submits complete documents with the claim or manifests that they will no longer submit additional supporting documents. If the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) does not notify the taxpayer that their documents are incomplete, the 120-day period begins from the taxpayer’s submission. If the BIR notifies the taxpayer that additional documents are needed, the 120-day period begins from the submission or the end of the 30-day period given to submit additional documents.� - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟭𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰 𝘁𝗼 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟯𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟳, the 120-day period begins from the date of filing of the administrative claim for refund with complete supporting documents. The taxpayer is not allowed to submit additional documents after the filing of the claim. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟴 𝘁𝗼 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟭𝟴, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟭, the 𝘛𝘢𝘹 𝘙𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘓𝘢𝘸 (𝘛𝘙𝘈𝘐𝘕 𝘓𝘢𝘸) shortened the 120-day period for the CIR to process administrative claims for VAT refund to 90 days. The 90-day period begins from the submission of the official receipts or invoices and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund. If the documents are incomplete, the application will not be accepted. Any unsupported claim shall be outrightly disallowed, resulting in full or partial denial of the claim. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟭𝟵, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟭 𝘁𝗼 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟯𝟬, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟯, the 90-day period begins from the submission of the official receipts or invoices and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund. A 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 (𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵) was released by the BIR as basis for the completeness of the submitted documents. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗝𝘂𝗹𝘆 𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟯 𝘁𝗼 𝗢𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟭𝟳, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟰, the 90-day period begins from the submission of the official receipts or invoices and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund, as provided in the 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗢𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟭𝟴, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟰 𝘁𝗼 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵 𝟯𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱, the 90-day period begins from the acceptance by the processing office of the claim or application for VAT refund with complete documents, as provided in the 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵. Applications with incomplete documents will not be accepted. - For administrative claims for VAT refund or credit filed 𝗯𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗔𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗹 𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱 𝗼𝗻𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗱𝘀, the 90-day period begins from the submission of the certified true copies of the invoices or official receipts and other supporting documents for the application for VAT refund, as provided in the 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘵. If documents are incomplete, the application will not be received and processed by the processing office. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167773. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AfyJFgrrP/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has suspended a lawyer for using vulgar words in a social media post. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division found Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III guilty of simple misconduct and suspended him from the practice of law for one year. The case arose from a Twitter post made by Atty. Falcis defending his brother, Nicko, against accusations related to a qualified theft complaint filed by Kris Aquino (Aquino): “𝘠𝘶𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘣𝘪𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘯𝘢 𝘥𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘢𝘯 𝘥𝘺𝘢𝘯, 𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘢 𝘬𝘢𝘺𝘰. 𝘚𝘢 𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘯𝘪 𝘒𝘳𝘪𝘴, 𝘱𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘯𝘨 𝘱𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘢 𝘯𝘢 𝘬𝘢𝘺𝘰 𝘢𝘨𝘢𝘥. 𝘗𝘦𝘳𝘰 𝘴𝘢 𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘯𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘯 𝘯𝘢 𝘴𝘩𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘮𝘺 𝘣𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳, 𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘢 𝘢𝘬𝘰 𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘨 𝘴𝘢 𝘪𝘯𝘺𝘰? 𝘗𝘢𝘬𝘺𝘶 𝘬𝘢𝘺𝘰 𝘮𝘨𝘢 𝘨𝘢𝘨𝘰 𝘩𝘢𝘩𝘢 𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘺𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘣𝘪𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘴.” Jason Gene Baltao (Baltao), Aquino’s former business partner, filed a complaint against Atty. Falcis before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Atty. Falcis argued that previous SC rulings held that the phrase “𝘱𝘶𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯𝘢” is often used to express anger or frustration, not to defame. He also claimed that lawyers are entitled to freedom of speech and expression. The IBP found that Atty. Falcis violated the 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈) by using offensive language and recommended a penalty of a fine and reprimand. The SC agreed with the IBP’s findings but imposed a heavier penalty of suspension. Under Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA, lawyers must use dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in both their professional and personal dealings. They must not use abusive, offensive, or improper language, whether spoken or written, including on social media. Such conduct undermines the dignity of the legal profession. Section 37 of the same Canon requires lawyers to ensure that their online posts—whether public or shared within a limited audience—uphold the dignity of the profession, protect it from disrepute, and maintain respect for the law. Section 36 also requires lawyers to understand the benefits, risks, and ethical implications of using social media. Ruling that Atty. Falcis failed to meet these standards, the SC stressed that he should have understood the risks and consequences of his statements on social media, including how they can spread widely, reach all kinds of audiences, and influence both lawyers and non-lawyers, including children. The SC held that the lawyer’s oath and their duties and responsibilities serve as the limit of free speech for lawyers. The SC also reminded lawyers of the nature of social media, which encompasses a wide audience and may not easily be restricted. The SC explained that Atty. Falcis’ actions amounted to misconduct, defined as intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule or standard of behavior, whether work-related or not. It is considered simple misconduct if there is no corruption or clear intent to violate the law. The SC increased the penalty from a fine to suspension due to Atty. Falcis’ prior administrative violations, including direct and indirect contempt, and the seriousness of his use of profane and offensive language. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167468 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/16wsjthnjP/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that Koronadal City cannot stop a bus company from using its own private terminal and force it to use the city’s common terminal, as these would violate the company’s property rights. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 issued a writ of injunction against Koronadal City and its officials, prohibiting them from blocking and rerouting the buses of Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. (Yellow Bus) and requiring it to use the City of Koronadal Integrated Transport Terminal Complex (common terminal). Sangguniang Panlungsod of Koronadal City, through 𝘖𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘕𝘰. 9, 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 2018, created the common terminal to provide efficient transport services, reduce traffic congestion and pollution in the city’s business center, and generate revenue for public services. Yellow Bus filed a complaint for injunction to stop the implementation of the ordinance, arguing that the city unlawfully interfered with its right to use its own private terminal. It claimed that as a result, it has paid more than PHP 1 million in terminal fees while travel time of its buses increased by 20-25 minutes and dispatch times were disrupted. Koronadal City argued that after being designated as the administrative seat of Region XII, it was required to have a centralized transport terminal, as part of its valid exercise of its power to regulate traffic, promote public welfare, and generate revenue. Agreeing with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, the SC recognized Yellow Bus’ ownership rights to its private terminal, including the right to use and manage the property, as protected by the Constitution. The SC emphasized that an LGU’s exercise of police power is valid only if it aims to address a public concern and the methods used are reasonably necessary. In this case, forcing all PUVs to use the common terminal while effectively prohibiting private terminals was excessive and not reasonably necessary to achieve that goal. The SC said that the measures imposed by the city were too broad and excessive for their purpose. The city also did not prove that compelling PUVs to use the common terminal was the only solution to the traffic problem. The SC added that there is no legal basis to block Yellow Bus from using its own facility or to force rerouting, as the ordinance did not expressly mandate that all PUVs use the common terminal or prohibit private terminals. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167210 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/SupremeCourtPhilippines/posts/pfbid0NpSWn1Pv6wgUW3JESMmA8RNjeSfNPS268FRY7rp96VA2hU8E17L1HTzsjnGg91rcl This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has ruled that similarities in trademark or logo designs that may confuse purchasers prevent the registration of later marks, even if new words are added. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division granted Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC’s (Starwood) consolidated petitions and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) rulings allowing the registration of Oceanic Empire Limited’s (Oceanic) marks. Oceanic filed to register the trademarks “𝐖 𝐆𝐋𝐎𝐁𝐀𝐋𝐂𝐄𝐍𝐓𝐄𝐑” and “𝐖 𝐅𝐈𝐅𝐓𝐇 𝐀𝐕𝐄𝐍𝐔𝐄” and had earlier secured registration for “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑.” Starwood, owner of several registered "𝐖” trademarks for hotels and entertainment services, opposed the applications and sought the cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑,” arguing that Oceanic’s marks were confusingly similar to its trademarks. Starwood argued that Oceanic would benefit from the popularity and reputation of its brand and that this would mislead the public into believing that Oceanic’s business was connected with Starwood. Ruling in favor of Starwood, the SC explained that trademark protection prevents confusion of goods and businesses, and that only the likelihood, not actual proof, of confusion is required. Each case must be assessed based on the resemblance of the marks and the relatedness of the services. Under the 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗧𝗲𝘀𝘁, emphasis is placed on the dominant or most striking features of the marks rather than on minor differences. In this case, the SC ruled that "𝐖" is the dominant feature of both Starwood’s and Oceanic’s marks. While Starwood’s "𝐖" is registered as a word mark, the Court clarified that Starwood cannot claim the letter "𝐖," but only its distinct stylized version. The Court stressed that purchasers would immediately notice the similarity between the parties’ "𝐖" marks. It held that minor textual differences do not change the fact that both use the same style, which looks visually similar. The SC thus directed the Director of the Bureau of Trademarks to deny Oceanic’s application for registration of trademark, and to grant Starwood’s petition for cancellation of the “𝐖 𝐓𝐎𝐖𝐄𝐑” mark. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166975. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/194QBdnYhk/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s acts creating a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse, their children, and common children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct” under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 which serves as a ground for legal separation. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division granted the petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife, after finding that her actions constituted grossly abusive conduct under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦. The couple married in 2003 and later had two children. To support their family, the wife started selling coffee, but they still faced financial hardships. The husband studied nursing with hopes of eventually relocating their family abroad. However, his plan to move abroad never materialized. During the marriage, the husband claimed he faced various abusive behaviors from his wife. He reported that she controlled their finances and refused to provide financial help, even when he needed treatment for his toothache and was advised to get a root canal. The husband also claimed that at a party, his wife told their friends she wanted to cut off his penis because they were no longer having sex. He also alleged that she shared stories about him with family and friends, often twisting the facts to make him look bad. The husband also said that his wife refused marriage counseling, prohibited him from seeing his friends, manipulated their children to force him to provide more financial support, and maintained a controlling attitude throughout their marriage. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for legal separation after finding that the wife’s behavior amounted to grossly abusive conduct. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that their disagreements were ordinary marital disputes. The SC affirmed the RTC defining acts constituting “grossly abusive conduct”, which is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, to include those acts by a spouse that create a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse or the children. The SC also stressed that courts must decide this issue on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts and evidence presented. While the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 does not allow absolute divorce, spouses may legally separate by order of a court without ending their marriage. Unlike a declaration that a marriage is void, a legal separation does not break the marital bond. Among the grounds for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 is repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against the spouse, their common child, or the spouse’s child. The SC added that this interpretation is consistent with the State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage as a basic social institution. In this case, the SC found that the wife’s actions, taken together, created a hostile and intimidating environment for the husband. He was made to constantly follow her lead, and his efforts to fix the marriage through counseling and other interventions were unsuccessful. Witnesses also confirmed her controlling behavior, which supported the finding of a hostile home environment. Because of this, the SC ruled that the husband was justified in seeking reassignment to another province to distance himself from the situation at home. The SC granted the legal separation and sent the case back to the RTC for the dissolution and division of the couple’s property. It also directed the RTC to decide on the custody and support of their children. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BGfS7M48Y/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has found a clerk of court guilty of multiple offenses under the 2025 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘖𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘭 for committing serious dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and gross misconduct. In a 𝘗𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘮 Decision, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 imposed the penalty of dismissal on Luzviminda G. Hernandez (Hernandez), Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Buenavista, Agusan Del Norte. Hernandez was found to have falsified her Daily Time Record to show that she reported to work from April 26 to 28, 2023, when she was actually in Dipolog City on the said dates, attending a convention she was not authorized to attend using the MTC court stenographer’s identity. In dismissing Hernandez, the SC ruled that she committed serious dishonesty for using her co-worker’s identity to attend the convention; falsifying her Daily Time Record; causing the issuance of a certificate of attendance, acknowledgement receipt, and LGU checks; and signing papers related to the convention despite her lack of authority to do so. The SC said that by creating the false appearance of authorized attendance and entitlement to public funds, her acts caused harm to the government. The SC also ruled that Hernandez committed falsification for knowingly making false entries in her Daily Time Record, as well as in the attendance and reimbursement papers she prepared and used on behalf of her co-worker without authority. Additionally, the SC found that Hernandez intended to secure reimbursement for herself by using falsified documents. Hernandez was also found guilty of gross misconduct for her repeated acts of falsification and misrepresentation, which showed clear intent to violate established rules. These were deliberate acts, not mere errors in judgment, reflecting a persistent disregard for proper procedures, said the SC. Since dismissal from service could no longer be imposed due to Hernandez’s compulsory retirement in 2024, the Court instead ordered the forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and disqualified her from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166752. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18BnQZQHWh/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has ruled that the unilateral imposition of reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme amounts to constructive dismissal. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC En Banc found Fiber Textile Manufacturing Corp. (FMC) liable for constructively dismissing seven production workers after reducing their six-day workweek to only two to three days and implementing a work rotation plan without their consent, despite FMC’s claim that the workers agreed to the temporary scheme during a meeting on the shortage of raw materials. The workers filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, claiming that they were effectively dismissed when they were told not to return to work. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the workers, but the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals upheld FMC’s actions as a valid exercise of management prerogative. The SC disagreed. It emphasized that while employers may adopt flexible work arrangements during economic difficulties or national emergencies, these arrangements must comply with the requirements set out in Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Department Advisory No. 2, Series of 2009. The SC explained that employers must first consult affected employees and obtain the voluntary support of the majority of workers. Employers must also notify the DOLE before implementing the arrangement and prove that the company is suffering from actual or reasonably imminent economic difficulties. In this case, the SC held that FMC failed to prove that the workers voluntarily agreed to the reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme. The Court ruled that informing employees of the arrangement does not equate to securing their consent. FMC also failed to notify the DOLE before implementation and failed to prove that it was suffering from actual or imminent economic difficulties that would justify the reduction of workdays. The SC emphasized that while employers may adopt flexible work arrangements to prevent business losses, such measures must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of workers. FMC’s unlawful reduction of workdays amounted to constructive dismissal because it resulted in diminished salaries, making continued employment unreasonable for the workers. In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen stressed that the requirement of mutual consent in flexible work arrangements originates from the consensual nature of employment contracts, such that employers cannot unilaterally alter work schedules in a manner that diminishes employees’ pay. In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa agreed that FMC remained liable for constructive dismissal for failing to prove that the workers voluntarily agreed to the reduced workdays and work rotation plan. However, he emphasized that FMC had no raw materials to work with for several months, significantly affecting production operations. Thus, he stated that FMC faced a reasonably imminent economic difficulty that could justify the temporary adoption of flexible work arrangements. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166287 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Kkgp5Lcbp/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has clarified that the rules on modifying circumstances—factors that can lessen or increase penalties—apply in cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide involving a motor vehicle. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC En Banc upheld Noli Z. Ilon’s (Ilon) conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but reduced his sentence because he voluntarily surrendered to the police. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), reckless imprudence is acting without intent to harm but still causing injury or death to another due to a clear lack of precaution. The SC emphasized that motorists are expected to drive at a reasonable speed suited to road and weather conditions, especially near intersections. In this case, Ilon admitted that he failed to slow down despite knowing he was approaching an intersection. He even increased his speed, leading him to hit the trisikad that caused Lee de la Cruz’s death. The SC clarified that Ilon’s voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance that reduces his penalty. It explained that while Article 365 of the RPC generally allows trial courts to impose penalties without applying the rules on mitigating and aggravating circumstances under Article 64 of the RPC, this does not apply when reckless imprudence results in death involving a motor vehicle. In such cases, Article 64 must be followed. The SC reviewed the amendments to Article 365—from Act No. 3992, or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, passed in 1932, through Batas Pambansa Blg. 398 passed in 1983—and found that Congress consistently retained the clause excluding cases where death results from reckless imprudence involving motor vehicles from the usual discretion given to trial courts. This means that courts must apply Article 64 to determine the proper penalty. The SC observed, however, an inconsistency: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with the use of a motor vehicle may be mitigated, while those resulting in serious bodily injury or damage to property are left to the discretion of the trial courts. Finding this distinction unjust, the SC directed that copies of its Decision be furnished to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, to alert its co-equal branches of this inconsistency and for possible legislative action. Ilon was sentenced to up to two years and four months in prison and ordered to pay the heirs of de la Cruz PHP 629,883.45 in damages. In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen noted that piecemeal amendments to the RPC have led to inconsistencies in criminal law. He called for the consolidation of all criminal provisions into a single, unified code to ensure fairness, clarity, and the orderly administration of justice. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166162 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1GL7mpELMc/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has ruled that non-verbal threatening gestures with criminal intent may be considered grave threats under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊). In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division acquitted Gregory Israel of grave threats after finding no criminal intent in his gesture of pretending to shoot and behead two individuals. But it clarified that the crime of grave threats may be committed through non-verbal gestures and not only through spoken or written words. Israel, who claimed to be a Belgian architect allowed to practice his profession in the Philippines, was hired by Belgian business partners Christine Helena Amanda Navez and Olivier Edmund Denonville for the construction of their building. After Israel refused to correct the construction defects in the said building, Navez and Denonville filed a case for damages against him. Sometime in 2017, while Navez and Denonville were on their way home from the airport, they nearly collided with Israel’s motorcycle. The latter then allegedly made two overt gestures: pointing his fingers at Navez’s head as if pulling a gun trigger and drawing his fingers across his neck as if threatening to behead Navez. Israel was convicted of grave threats. When his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he sought relief from the SC, arguing that he had no criminal intent when he performed the acts, and that Article 282 of the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 does not cover pure non-verbal gestures. The SC acquitted Israel after finding that criminal intent was not proven. But it disagreed with his other argument, ruling that non-verbal gestures may be considered grave threats. To convict for grave threats, the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 requires two elements: the 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗿 𝘂𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝘀 and the 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲. The SC held that Article 282 of the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 does not differentiate between threats conveyed verbally and those expressed through non-verbal gestures. What matters is the communication of a threat intended to intimidate. Although the second paragraph of the provision specifies that threats can be conveyed orally or in writing, it does not exclude threats conveyed through non-verbal means. Therefore, threats can be either verbal or non-verbal. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166072.

Naglabas ang #KorteSuprema ng isang Desisyon sa wikang Filipino, na layong gawing mas malapit sa mga mamamayan, mas nauunawaan at mas nakatuon sa mga pangangailangan ng publiko ang katarungan. Sa Desisyon sa kasong Velarde at Macasaet v. Kagagalang-Galang na Hukuman ng Pag-aapela sa Buwis na isinulat ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, nagpasya ang Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte na isantabi ang petisyong inihain nina Mel V. Velarde at Angeline L. Macasaet dahil naging 𝘮𝘰𝘰𝘵 na o wala nang saysay ang usapin. Kinuwestiyon sa petisyon ang mga naging pagdinig ng Hukuman ng Pag-aapela sa Buwis o Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) kaugnay ng kasong kriminal na 𝘵𝘢𝘹 𝘦𝘷𝘢𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 na nag-ugat umano sa sadyang pagdeklara ng mas mababang halaga ng transaksiyong may kinalaman sa ari-arian (𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘭𝘶𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘢 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯). Naging 𝘮𝘰𝘰𝘵 ang kaso nang pagbigyan ng Court of Tax Appeals ang 𝘮𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 ng mga petisyoner sa pagtanggi nito sa kanilang 𝘥𝘦𝘮𝘶𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘰 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦. Ibig sabihin, tuluyan nang isinantabi ang kasong kriminal. Dahil dito, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na wala nang natitirang aktuwal na kontobersiyang kailangang resolbahin at hindi rin ito isa sa mga eksepsiyon sa doktrina ng 𝘮𝘰𝘰𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴. Sa paggamit ng wikang Filipino, mas naipapaintindi ng Korte Suprema sa mga mamamayan ang pangangatwiran sa mga desisyon nito. Mas madali kasing maintindihan ng publiko kung nakasulat ito sa wikang Filipino, bilang isa sa mga opisyal na wika ng bansa at wikang malawak na nauunawaan ng nakararami. Kapag ang batas ay naipahahayag sa wikang ginagamit ng mga mamamayan, nakatutulong itong patatagin ang tiwala ng publiko at iparamdam sa kanilang bahagi sila ng sistema. Higit sa lahat, natutugunan ang pangako ng Saligang Batas na ang katarungan ay dapat madaling maabot at mapakinabangan ng lahat. Basahin ang buong press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/supreme-court-uses-filipino.../ Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BBHZqMyYx/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH En Banc, during its special session today, May 13, 2026, in G.R. No. 278747 (Rodrigo Roa Duterte and Senator Ronald “Bato” M. Dela Rosa v. Hon. Lucas Bersamin, et al.) has given respondents a non-extendible period of 72 hours to comment on Senator Ronald “Bato” M. Dela Rosa’s Urgent Manifestation with Omnibus Motion (Urgent Manifestation) and Extremely Urgent Supplemental Manifestation with Motion (Supplemental Manifestation) seeking to prevent his arrest, detention, and transfer in connection with the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Senator Dela Rosa was likewise directed to file his Reply within a non-extendible period of 72 hours from receipt of the respondents’ Comment. The Resolution shall be deemed served on the parties and their counsels and released once uploaded to eCourt PH and upon publication on the SC website. The SC held that this is without prejudice to the Court taking any interim or urgent measures as prayed for by Senator Dela Rosa, should it become necessary. On May 11, 2026, Senator Dela Rosa filed the Urgent Manifestation in response to reports that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued a warrant of arrest against him in connection with its drug war investigations. Senator Dela Rosa sought a temporary restraining order (TRO), a writ of preliminary injunction, or a status quo ante order (SQAO) to prevent his arrest, detention, or transfer without prior judicial authorization. He also questioned the validity of a subpoena issued by the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group directing him to appear at Camp Crame regarding alleged extrajudicial killings during his time as Davao City Police Director. On the same day, Senator Dela Rosa filed the Supplemental Manifestation alleging that National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives attempted to block his entry into the Senate Session Hall and that former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes) presented what he claimed to be a copy of an ICC arrest warrant against him. Senator Dela Rosa prayed for a TRO and/or SQAO prohibiting the NBI and Trillanes from arresting or detaining him or serving any ICC warrant or other foreign document. A copy of the Resolution and available pleadings may be downloaded from the Current Cases section of the SC website. READ the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/press-briefer-may-13-2026/ Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EWEbYSygw/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has clarified that a contractor’s lack of tools, equipment, or machinery does not automatically amount to prohibited labor-only contracting when the contracted work does not require them. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC's Third Division held that MMA Competent Manpower & General Services, Inc. (MMA) is a legitimate job contractor and the employer of petitioners Richard Delera and Dionel Quiling. MMA is a domestic corporation that offers human resource and support services to clients, including Philippine Foremost Milling Corp. (PFMC), which is involved in flour milling, and Amigo Logistics Corp. (Amigo), which manages logistics such as warehousing and trucking. MMA assigned petitioners to PFMC and Amigo as feed mill bagger and pollard stacker, respectively. After they were reported for policy violations, MMA preventively suspended but later cleared them of charges. PFMC and Amigo requested the petitioners’ reassignment. MMA initially had to place them on floating status, but later offered their reassignment to Cavite and Bataan, which they declined. They instead filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that MMA was a labor-only contractor and that they were regular employees of PFMC and Amigo. The SC ruled that MMA, which had substantial funds of PHP 27 million, was a legitimate labor contractor even though it lacked tools, equipment, or machinery. It distinguished between 𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗹𝗮𝗯𝗼𝗿 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴, wherein employers may hire a contractor to perform specific jobs provided it has sufficient funds and tools, and prohibited 𝗹𝗮𝗯𝗼𝗿-𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴, where a contractor merely provides workers without having sufficient funds and tools, and the workers perform tasks directly related to the employer’s main business. Citing the case of 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘳 𝘐𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘦 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘷. 𝘉𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘣𝘪𝘯𝘨, which provides a limited exception where the work is merely supportive and does not require tools, the SC found that petitioners performed post-production tasks similar to packaging and storing, which merely supported PFMC’s and Amigo’s operations. Since these duties do not require specialized machinery or technical expertise, the SC ruled that they could be contracted out even without major investment in tools or equipment. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165353. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1C4xZpnufF/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has disbarred a lawyer for using a false Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance number in his pleadings. In a 𝘗𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘮 Decision, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 disbarred Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) for dishonest conduct in violation of the 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈). Atty. Hidalgo represented the defendant in a malicious prosecution case pending before Branch 153, Regional Trial Court, Biñan City. In the answer he filed for his client, Atty. Hidalgo included his MCLE compliance number, which is required for lawyers. The plaintiff's lawyer filed a motion to expunge Atty. Hidalgo's answer from the records, claiming that he did not actually comply with the MCLE requirements. Attached to the motion was a Certification from the MCLE Office stating that Atty. Hidalgo had not complied from the first compliance period up to the present. In ordering the disbarment of Atty. Hidalgo, the SC emphasized that Canon II of the 𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈 requires lawyers to act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior. Lawyers are also required under Canon III to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for laws and legal processes. The SC held that Atty. Hidalgo violated these Canons, stating that his act of indicating false information in the pleadings he filed “constitutes bad faith and dishonesty, and shows blatant disrespect of the courts and its rules.” The SC also fined Atty. Hidalgo PHP 35,000 for willful disobedience, a less serious offense, for ignoring the IBP's order when he did not submit an answer and a verified position paper. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164745. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/17cYihpHh7/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵). The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child. The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations. During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned. The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father. In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering. In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm. As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CygX1H15z/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH has affirmed that the President does not have the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition for review filed by the Office of the President (OP). The petition challenged a ruling of the Court of Appeals that voided the OP’s dismissal of then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang. While Carandang can no longer be reinstated because his term as Overall Deputy Ombudsman already expired in 2020, the SC said that the penalties imposed on him, including the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, have no legal effect. It ruled that Carandang is entitled to his full retirement benefits and to the salaries he would have received during his preventive suspension and dismissal, up to the end of his term. In 2017, Carandang was reported to have claimed in an ambush interview that the Office of the Ombudsman had proof of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of then President Rodrigo R. Duterte and his family, including bank transaction records said to have been transmitted by the Anti-Money Laundering Council to the Ombudsman. These statements related to a complaint filed by former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV regarding President Duterte’s alleged unexplained accumulated wealth. Two administrative complaints were then filed against Carandang before the OP, accusing him of improperly disclosing confidential information and showing partiality during the interview. The OP ordered Carandang’s preventive suspension, but this was not enforced by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales. Carandang challenged the complaints, arguing that the SC had already ruled in the 2014 case of 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘐𝘐𝘐 𝘷. 𝘖𝘗 (𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴) that Section 8(2) of the 𝘖𝘮𝘣𝘶𝘥𝘴𝘮𝘢𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1989 was unconstitutional for granting the President administrative disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman. The OP, claiming that the SC abandoned its ruling in 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 in the 2016 case of 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦 𝘷. 𝘖𝘗 (𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦), proceeded to find Carandang liable for graft and corruption as well as betrayal of public trust and dismissed him from service. Then newly appointed Ombudsman Samuel Martires directed Carandang to cease and desist from performing his duties and declared his post vacant. Holding that 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 had not been abandoned by 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦, the SC clarified that 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦 did not revisit or overturn 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 because that case merely upheld the dismissal of a complaint against then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro without imposing any sanction. The President’s disciplinary authority and the constitutionality of Section 8(2) were not at issue. 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 was also decided by the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, and could not be modified or reversed by a Division ruling, such as 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦. The SC explained that when it decided 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 in 2014, it became part of the law of the land, firmly establishing that the President has no authority to remove the Deputy Ombudsman. Reaffirming 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴, the SC stressed that the Constitution expressly characterizes the Ombudsman as independent: free from executive control, supervision, or political influence. Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164549. Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AzP4CYpjU/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has acquitted a mother of parricide over her daughter’s death, exempting her from criminal liability after finding that she has schizophrenia and her mental state deprived her of the capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of her act. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division granted a mother’s appeal and overturned her parricide conviction on the ground of legal insanity due to schizophrenia, an exempting circumstance under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦. The mother was charged with parricide for the killing of her five-year old daughter after she was seen embracing the child and simultaneously jumping off a bridge into a river with her, which led to her daughter’s death. While a man aboard a styrofoam banca was able to save the mother, he was unable to locate the child. The daughter’s lifeless body was found in the river the next day. The mother claimed she was not in her right mind at the time. She could only remember walking with her daughter and had no memory of the incident itself. She said she only regained consciousness while floating in the water. A licensed physician from the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) testified that the mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) brushed aside the claim of insanity as she entered into a plea of “not guilty” and raised insanity as a defense only after the prosecution rested its case. The RTC convicted the mother and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua after finding that she was sane at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. The SC disagreed. It ruled that the mother was not criminally liable because her mental condition during the incident prevented her from understanding the nature and wrongfulness of her actions. Insanity is defined as a disease or defect of the brain manifested in language or conduct. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, it is one of the circumstances that exempts a person from criminal liability. In 𝙋𝙚𝙤𝙥𝙡𝙚 𝙫. 𝙋𝙖ñ𝙖, the SC laid down a three-way test to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance: • 𝙛𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, the insanity must be present at the time of the commission of the crime; • 𝙨𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it must be medically proven; and • 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it must render the accused incapable of appreciating the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of the act. Insanity must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Because it involves a person’s state of mind, courts look at overt acts or outward behavior. As a rule, insanity must be supported by medical evidence, unless there are extraordinary circumstances where such evidence is not available. While people who know the accused may testify about their observations, courts give greater weight to the findings and evaluations of qualified medical experts. In this case, the SC determined that the mother was able to medically prove that she was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the crime based on the testimony and mental status examination reports from psychiatrists. The SC further explained that schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by the inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality. Often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions, the medical condition deprives a person of discernment, satisfying the third requisite in the 𝘗𝘢ñ𝘢 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦. Here, the psychiatrist testified that the mother was mentally disturbed at the time of the incident, showing signs of paranoia and perceiving threats, gossip, and envy directed at her. While the SC exempted the mother from criminal liability, it still held her civilly liable and ordered her to pay the victim’s heirs PHP 75,000 in civil indemnity and PHP 200,000 in moral, exemplary, and temperate damages. The SC also ordered the mother’s immediate transfer from the Correctional Institution for Women to the NCMH for her treatment. She will be released only upon the order of the RTC based on a recommendation from her attending physician at the hospital. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164320 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BRLtBVgy1/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that ISCO Holding Corporation (ISCO) cannot register its “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍 & 𝐃𝐄𝐒𝐈𝐆𝐍” mark as it constitutes Nikon Corporation’s trade name and is confusingly similar to the well-known “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” trademark of the said corporation. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied ISCO’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA), which rejected ISCO’s trademark application. ISCO filed an application for a trademark for its home and household goods containing the design of an anchor enclosed in a circle with the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍”. Nikon Corp., a foreign corporation and prior registrant and user of the “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” mark in the Philippines, opposed the application, arguing that ISCO’s mark is confusingly similar to its own mark. The Intellectual Property Office–Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO‑BLA) agreed with Nikon Corp. and denied ISCO’s application. Although the IPO Office of the Director General later reversed this ruling, the CA reinstated the IPO-BLA’s decision, prompting ISCO to elevate the case to the SC. ISCO claimed that its goods are unrelated to Nikon Corp.’s and that differences, such as the image of an anchor enclosed in a circle and the color scheme, prevent consumer confusion. The SC upheld the CA’s ruling and held that ISCO’s mark cannot be registered. It explained that trademarks are used to identify and distinguish goods or services. Under Section 147 of the 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, one of the rights of a trademark owner is to exclude others from using their trademark in a way that would confuse consumers and cause financial harm to the owner. If a well‑known trademark is registered in the Philippines, no other party may register an identical or confusingly similar mark—even if the goods are different. In this case, the SC found that Nikon Corp.’s trademark is well‑known. The NIKON mark has long been used, promoted, and registered worldwide, including in the Philippines, with the company enjoying significant global sales and market presence. The SC also found NIKON to be a highly distinctive trademark. It is a coined or invented word with no ordinary meaning in English or Filipino and is not commonly used in the Philippines except as a trademark. Analyzing the two marks, the SC found that ISCO’s trademark is confusingly similar to NIKON’s. It applied the 𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐓𝐞𝐬𝐭, which focuses on the most noticeable and memorable part of the marks. Minor differences in design, color, or layout are disregarded. Both ISCO’s and Nikon Corp.’s marks prominently use the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍.” This word is the dominant feature of both marks. They are spelled the same, appear in bold capital letters, and sound exactly the same when pronounced. Because of this, the SC ruled that the two marks create the same visual and auditory impression. The SC explained that if ISCO were allowed to use its NIKON mark, consumers would likely assume a connection with Nikon Corp. Given its reputation for cameras, the public might believe that ISCO’s household appliances are made, approved, or endorsed by Nikon Corp., or that it has expanded into household products. The SC also warned that ISCO’s use of the NIKON mark would damage Nikon Corp.’s interests because it would weaken its mark’s ability to uniquely identify a single source of goods. The law protects famous trademarks from such uses to prevent the blurring of their distinctiveness and to preserve their value and reputation. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164274 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CntPbFggX/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means. In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019. Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded. The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵. Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC. Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration. The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People. Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later. The SC rejected both arguments. Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased. The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel. The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution. The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities. Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are: • Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo • Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen • Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa • Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda • Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan • Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez • Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves. In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years. Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent: • Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando • Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier • Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario • Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez • Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao • Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1JfirdQmh5/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has ruled that sounds incident to the operation of an educational institution, those arising from a school’s regular activities, are not considered a nuisance and cannot make the school liable for damages. In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division granted the petition of Couples for Christ School of the Morning Star (School) and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) ruling that awarded damages to residents of Saint Joseph Subdivision in Barangay Villa Kananga, Butuan City, where the school is located. Wideline I. Malonda and others, who are residents of the Subdivision, claimed they were often exposed to loud noises from the School, such as drums and bugles being played, teachers speaking through microphones and megaphones, and students running, cheering and shouting during games played at the multipurpose center. The residents claimed that these sounds, heard day and night, disturbed their sleep and peace at home. In its defense, the School said it has been operating since 2012 with the necessary permits and clearances and that any noise comes only from regular classes. It added that the City Environment and Natural Resources Office conducted a test and found the noise to be within the allowed limits for residential areas. The School also claimed it took steps to reduce noise, such as building higher fences, planting trees, using small speakers, and limiting activities to 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the residents’ complaint, ruling that they failed to prove they were harmed by the noise. The RTC also found that the School did not intend to harm the residents and acted in good faith by taking steps to reduce the noise. On appeal, the CA ruled in the residents’ favor, holding that the School’s noise, which came not only from classes but also from other social functions in the multi-purpose hall, was a nuisance that caused discomfort and annoyance to the residents. The SC overturned the CA’s ruling. It held that academic noise, or sounds from legitimate school activities, is not a nuisance. Nuisance includes any disturbance that interferes with a person, property or comfort and enjoyment of all citizens. The SC ruled that the determination of whether a noise is a nuisance requires more than just considering the location, environment, and its effect on residents. Thus, for noise to be considered nuisance, the SC considered in the 𝘍𝘳𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘊𝘰𝘳𝘱. 𝘷. 𝘈𝘊 𝘌𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘐𝘯𝘤. the: 1. reliability of the noise pollution tests conducted, 2. introduction by the defendant of measures or improvements to mitigate the noise, 3. allowable noise levels, 4. defendant’s intention (or lack thereof) to cause harm to the plaintiff, 5. number of complaining witnesses, 6. representativeness of the plaintiff, and 7. actions of the plaintiff to alleviate his or her plight. Adopting the framework, the SC finds that the sounds emanating from the School arose from its ordinary operations as an educational institution, and that the respondents are hardly representative of the community. The SC also ruled that the residents failed to prove that the noise was unreasonably disturbing and that it worsened their health conditions. The residents’ statements showed only minor discomforts, not serious harm. The SC added that while location and environment are important in determining a nuisance, they must be weighed against whether the noise is normally expected from the activity involved. Here, the sounds complained of did not go beyond what could be reasonably expected from a school. The SC emphasized that there is no nuisance if an ordinary person would not find the sound disturbing, even if someone else is unusually sensitive to it. The SC explained: “𝘓𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯 𝘢 𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘱𝘰𝘱𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘺 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘹𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘱𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦’𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦. 𝘏𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳, 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦. 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘭𝘺, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘯𝘶𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘪𝘯𝘫𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘵𝘩 𝘰𝘳 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘰𝘳 𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘺𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘴.” The SC also denied the claim for damages since the School did not intend to harm or annoy the residents and had taken steps to reduce the noise. There was no evidence that the school caused the noise willfully, with malice or bad faith. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163502 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EFykMgd8g/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) has reiterated that the prohibition on carrying deadly weapons during elections applies to firearms and similar regulated weapons, but not to bladed instruments like knives, unless they are carried inside the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters from it, during election day. In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division granted the motion for reconsideration (MR) of its earlier ruling that found a man guilty of violating Section 261(p) of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 881, or the 𝘖𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘴 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘖𝘌𝘊), as amended by Section 32 of 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 7166. The SC held that while the man was found carrying a knife during the election period, there was no proof that he was in a polling place or within 100 meters of one during the days and hours prohibited under the 𝘖𝘌𝘊. The man was arrested during the 2018 elections after authorities found him carrying a kitchen knife outside his residence without written authorization from the Commission on Elections. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found him guilty of carrying a deadly weapon during the election period. The SC initially affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. However, upon MR, the SC acquitted the man after finding that the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the offense. The SC clarified the scope of the weapon ban during elections. In 𝘉𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘢 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, it held that bladed instruments are not covered by Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 and Section 32 of 𝘙𝘈 7166, which prohibit the carrying of firearms outside one’s residence or place of business during the election period. However, carrying of deadly weapons in general, including knives, is still punished but under a different provision of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊—Section 261(p)—but only if done in a polling place or near it, and during specific election-related activities. Unlike Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 which prohibits carrying of 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 everywhere in public during election period, Section 261 (p) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 prohibits possession of 𝐝𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐲 𝐰𝐞𝐚𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐬 in general (including bladed instruments such as knives) only in or near polling places under the law. In this case, while the prosecution established that the man was carrying a knife during the election period, it failed to prove that the act was committed in a polling place or within 100 meters of one, and that it occurred during the days and hours specifically covered by Section 261(p). In the absence of proof that he was in or near a polling place during the specified days under the law, the man’s guilt was not established. Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163156 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1HpFoDVJrK/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) En Banc, during its session on Wednesday, April 8, 2026, through the ponencia of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr, denied the petition for certiorari filed by Merson C. Calubag (Calubag), which challenged the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolutions canceling his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson of Barangay Magtangale, San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, during the 2023 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. The COMELEC found that Calubag falsely stated a material fact in his COC when he declared he was not related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent Sangguniang Barangay member of Barangay Magtangale, despite his mother being a member. Section 10, or the “Anti-Dynasty clause” of Republic Act No. (RA) 10742 (Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015) requires that a candidate for the position in the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national office, or to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality where they seek to be elected. The SC “recognized the legislative framework in RA 10742 for preventing the creation and expansion of political dynasties in the country as the Legislative’s answer to the constitutional call to define political dynasties, at least at the barangay and [Sangguniang Kabataan] levels.” It held that such “breathes life to the constitutionally enshrined policy of the sovereign to prohibit political dynasties.” Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163046 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BJTpLDrNj/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.

The #SupremeCourtPH (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on April 8, 2026, dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Cezarah Rowena C. Discaya (Discaya) challenging the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against her for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘎𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘳𝘳𝘶𝘱𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵, and malversation through falsification of public documents. The SC ruled that the petition had become moot after the Ombudsman filed the corresponding Informations against Discaya with the Regional Trial Court, which subsequently issued a warrant of arrest. Although exceptions exist to safeguard constitutional rights, maintain orderly justice, or when charges are baseless or beyond authority, Discaya did not demonstrate any of these exceptions. The SC emphasized that determining probable cause during preliminary investigation is the exclusive function of the public prosecutor. As a rule, courts do not interfere with this determination. The SC further noted that the Ombudsman’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. The case arose from a complaint by DPWH Secretary Vivencio B. Dizon against Discaya and several officers from the DPWH Davao Occidental District Engineering Office. The issue concerned the construction of a concrete revetment in Culaman, Jose Abad Santos, Davao Occidental, awarded to St. Timothy Construction Corporation (STCC), owned by Discaya. Secretary Dizon claimed that the government was defrauded when STCC received the full contract payment of PHP 96.5 million despite the project’s non-completion. Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163046 Disclaimer: This content is reproduced in full and without modification from the Supreme Court Public Information Office (PIO). Originally published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office. Source: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1VmjuDmxsv/ This material is shared strictly for informational purposes only. No part of this content has been altered, edited, or modified. This content is not used for commercial purposes and remains the intellectual property of the Supreme Court Public Information Office.